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1 I adopt this coupling of terms from Afif Safieh, The Peace Process: From Breakthrough to Breakdown
(London: PLO, 1997).
2 US President Bill Clinton, Remarks at the Signing of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles,
Washington DC, 13 October 1993.
3 For a sample of such differing opinions, see David Makovsky, ‘Oslo is not Dead. It Cannot Die’,
Ha’aretz, 28 August 1998.
Dressing up domination as ‘cooperation’: the
case of Israeli-Palestinian water relations
JA N  S E L B Y *
Abstract. This article analyses the extent to which Israeli-Palestinian water relations were
affected and transformed by the Oslo process. Focusing in turn on the management of water
systems and supplies, the monitoring of water resources and the development of new
supplies, the article suggests that many of the seeming and much-lauded achievements of the
Oslo process were more cosmetic than real. Comparing Israeli-Palestinian water relations
before and since the onset of the Oslo process, the article contends that the Oslo agreements
did little more in this particular sphere than to dress up and discursively repackage Israel’s
domination of the West Bank water sector in a new vocabulary of Israeli-Palestinian
‘cooperation’.
Introduction
Most mainstream narratives of the course of the Oslo ‘peace process’ characterise it
according to what may be thought of as a ‘breakthrough to breakdown’ model.1
Such narratives assume, first, that September 1993 marked a sharp discontinuity in
Israeli-Palestinian relations, with the signing of the initial Oslo Accords opening ‘a
new era not only for the Middle East, but for the entire world’; second, that there
were a series of further ‘breakthroughs’, most notably the Cairo and Oslo II
agreements of 1994 and 1995, and the Palestinian elections of 1996; third, that there
exist significant policy and attitudinal differences between Labour and Likud
administrations, such that under the latter the peace process has inexorably tended
towards ‘breakdown’; and fourth, that the onset of the al-Aqsa intifada and the
election of Ariel Sharon signal the final dissolution and reversal of all that was
achieved during the mid-1990s.2 The peace process has ‘collapsed’ and ‘died’ –
though commentators differ in their views as to when this ‘death’ finally took place.3
Only a few – the exceptions being critics such as Noam Chomsky and Edward Said –
have questioned whether the Oslo process was ever really ‘alive’ in the first place, and
whether it ever constituted the enormous breakthrough that it was so often presented
as being.4
The Oslo process did of course bring about significant changes. It led to Israeli
recognition of the PLO as the ‘representative’ (if not ‘legitimate representative’) of the
Palestinian people; to the creation of an internationally recognised Palestinian
Authority (PA), with (albeit highly circumscribed) symbolic, legislative, administrative,
policing and territorial powers; to the return of countless Palestinian and especially
PLO ‘outsiders’ to the West Bank and Gaza, and the subordination of Palestinian
‘insiders’ to these new political and economic elites; to the limited rstructuring of both
Israeli-Palestinian economic relations, and the internal Palestinian economy (most
notably through the massive influx of international aid, and through the creation of
the PA system and PA-dominated monopolies); and it led to (so far ill-fated)
negotiations towards a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.5 Equally, the
Oslo process has clearly in large measure broken down since Autumn 2000. Nonethe-
less, the ‘breakthrough to breakdown’ model represents but one way of reading the
short history of the Oslo process. Many of the ‘changes’ that the Oslo process brought
about were more cosmetic than real. Moreover, with the benefit of time, it may well be
that the Oslo process is viewed less as a period of breakthrough between two distinct
periods of violence (the intifadas of 1987–93 and 2000–), than as a brief and relatively
unimportant interlude within a single and increasingly militarised era of intifada-cum-
war. Whether the signing of the initial Oslo Accords ‘opened a new era for the Middle
East’ remains a moot point, and subject to historical reinterpretation. In light of the
‘collapse’ of the ‘peace process’, and the rapidly escalating state of war in the West
Bank and Gaza, reinterpretations of this ill-fated process are more urgently needed
than ever.
Given this, my aim in this article is to offer a reassessment of the course of (one
sphere of) the Oslo process; to offer a counternarrative, that is, which lays stress
primarily on the continuities between the ‘pre-Oslo’, ‘Oslo’ and ‘breakdown’ periods,
rather than on the discontinuities between them. With this broad aim in mind, I
focus specifically on the management of water resources, systems and supplies
within the West Bank. The development of cooperative mechanisms for managing
the West Bank’s water resources, systems and supplies has often been lauded as one
122 Jan Selby
4 See, inter alia, Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, 2nd edn.
(London: Pluto, 1999), ch. 10; and Said, Peace and its Discontents: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-
Determination 1969–1994 (London: Vintage, 1995).
5 For excellent general accounts of these developments, see especially Chomsky, Fateful Triangle; Nick
Guyatt, The Absence of Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (London: Zed, 1998);
Said, Peace and its Discontents; Said, The End of the Peace Process: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo
Process (London: Granta, 2000); Graham Usher, Dispatches From Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the
Oslo Peace Process (London: Pluto, 1999); and Usher, Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and
Political Independence After Oslo, 2nd edn. (London: Pluto, 1997). On ‘inside’–‘outside’ relations, see
especially Hillel Frisch, Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and
Gaza (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998); on the political–economic dimensions
of the Oslo process, see especially Sara Roy, ‘De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and
Society since Oslo’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 28 (1999), pp. 64–82; and on the impact of foreign
aid, Rex Brynen, A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza
(Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2000).
of the major successes of the Oslo process. I contend, to the contrary, that routine
cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian water managers was taking place long
before the onset of the Oslo process, and that the distribution of powers and
responsibilities between these Israeli and Palestinian water managers changed little
between the pre-Oslo and Oslo periods. Much of what had previously been patron–
client relations under occupation were suddenly discursively repackaged and repre-
sented as instances of Israeli-Palestinian ‘co operation’. Moreover, the problems that
have beset ‘cooperation’ in the water arena since Oslo owe very little to policy
differences between the Labour and Likud administrations. On the contrary, in
terms of the control and management of the West Bank’s water resources, systems
and supplies, the continuities between the ‘pre-Oslo’, ‘Oslo’ and ‘breakdown’ periods
are much more striking than the discontinuities between them. The main conse-
quences of the Oslo water agreements, I argue, were not any significant transfer of
power between Israelis and Palestinians, but rather three things: the construction of
extra layers of bureaucracy which had few new powers, and which above all served
to symbolise and dissimulate Palestinian autonomy; a transfer of power from
Palestinian ‘insiders’ to PLO ‘outsiders’ returning from Tunis; and a transfer of
some of the burdens of occupation from Israel to both the PA and the international
donor community. With regard to Israeli-Palestinian relations, however, the Oslo
process did little more in this particular sphere than to dress up domination as
‘cooperation’.
The water issue is often presented as being absolutely pivotal to the future of
Israeli–Palestinian relations, and to the peace process in particular.6 I am not of this
view, and my aim in focusing on the water issue is not one of emphasising its
importance relative to other fields of Israeli-Palestinian relations. My hope, rather, is
that by detailing how an illustrative area of ‘low politics’ has been affected by the
Oslo process, it might be possible to free ourselves from the rhetoric of ‘cooper-
ation’, ‘peace’, ‘breakthrough’ and ‘breakdown’ which so bedevils analysis of the
‘high politics’ of the Oslo process, and to show instead how the fine fabric of
Palestinian self-rule has often differed in little more than name from that which
preceded it.
The main body of the article comes in two parts. The first and shorter one focuses
on the water accords of the Oslo II agreement, which formally inaugurated a system
for the coordinated management of the West Bank’s waters: I detail these accords’
main features, and draw attention to some of the excitement to which the Oslo II
‘breakthrough’ gave rise. The second and longer section endeavours to dig beneath
the surface of these apparently new cooperative mechanisms, and to show that all is
not quite as it seems. Focusing in turn on (a) the management of resources systems
and supplies, (b) the monitoring of water resources, and (c) the development of new
supplies, I argue that while the Oslo process has led to some improvements in water
supply to the West Bank’s Palestinian communities, the Oslo II water accords did
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6 Take, for instance, the words of Thomas Naff, testifying before the US Congress on 26 June 1990: ‘If
the crisis is not eased, it will result in a significant rise in the probability of an outbreak of warfare …
It is water, in the final analysis, that will determine the future of the occupied territories … and by
extension, the issue of conflict or peace’ , cited in Isam Shawwa, ‘The Water Situation in the Gaza
Strip’, in Gershon Baskin (ed.), Water: Conflict or Cooperation? (Jerusalem: Israel/Palestine Center for
Research and Information, 1992), p. 36.
little more than to formalise, and in the process legitimate, management systems and
relations which for the most part were already in existence.7
The Oslo II breakthrough
Of the water agreements so far achieved between Israel and the PLO, by far the
most important are to be found within the September 1995 Oslo II Agreement. The
1993 Declaration of Principles had said very little regarding water issues, calling for
the creation of a ‘Palestinian Water Administration Authority’, and for ‘[c]ooper-
ation in the field of water’ – but beyond these vague commitments the Declaration
had barely mentioned the issue.8 Building upon this, the 1994 Cairo Agreement had
stipulated that, with the exception of water supplies to Israeli settlements and
military areas, all water resources and systems in Gaza and the Jericho Area would
be ‘operated, managed and developed’ by the PA.9 Neither Gaza nor the Jericho
Area, however, are home to abundant water resources: both of them are downstream
areas with shallow and highly saline underground reserves, ones that, if mis-
managed, could do little to endanger Israeli water supplies. The Cairo articles on
water hardly betrayed evidence of Israeli generosity. By contrast, the water accords
of the Oslo II Agreement seemingly paved the way for the joint Israeli-Palestinian
management of the West Bank’s rich underground water resources.
Oslo II contained the first explicit and unequivocal recognition of ‘Palestinian
water rights in the West Bank’, precise details of which would be agreed upon
during permanent status negotiations.10 More significantly (at least in the short-
term), Oslo II committed Israel and the PA to establishing a ‘Joint Water Committee’
(JWC), with responsibility for overseeing the management of all of the West Bank’s
water and sewage resources and systems.11 The JWC would operate in seemingly egali-
tarian fashion: it would be made up of an equal number of Israeli and Palestinian
representatives, and decisions within it would be reached by consensus.12 The JWC
would have overall authority for surveying and protecting existing resources, for
developing supplies, for maintaining existing infrastructures, and for constructing
new ones.13 The JWC would not, however, be responsible for the day-to-day manage-
ment of resources and systems; it would function, rather, as a coordinating body,
with most on-the-ground work being undertaken separately by one or other of the
parties. Thus particular water and sewage systems would be controlled by either
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7 In what follows, I focus only on the substance of agreements reached, and say nothing of the
negotiations which lay behind them. It should become apparent, though, that the substance of the
Oslo II water accords does not reflect well on the Palestinian negotiators involved. For discussion, see
Jan Selby, Water, Power and Politics: An International Theoretical Analysis of the Palestinian Water
Crisis, Ph.D. thesis, Lancaster University, 2000, pp. 230–42.
8 Israel and the PLO, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
(Washington, DC, 13 September 1993), Article 7 (4); Annex III (1).
9 Israel and the PLO, Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Cairo, 4 May 1994), Annex
II, Article 2 (B.31.a).
10 Israel and the PLO, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Washington, DC, 28
September 1995), Annex III, Appendix 1, Article 40 (1).
11 Ibid., Article 40 (11, 12).
12 Ibid., Article 40 (13, 14).
13 Ibid., Article 40 (12); Schedule 8.
Israel or the PA: those systems ‘related solely to Palestinians’, which until then were
‘held by the military government and Civil Administration’, would be transferred to
the PA, while all other systems would remain under Israeli control.14 Israeli and
Palestinian water authorities would operate separately, but under the overall control
and direction of the JWC. Irrespective of its name, the JWC would be a ‘coordin-
ated’ and not a ‘joint’ management structure.15
Oslo II also stipulated that the two sides would establish, under the supervision of
the JWC, ‘no less than five Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETs)’, for
the monitoring and policing of the West Bank’s precious water resources, systems
and supplies.16 As with the JWC itself, the JSETs would operate according to strictly
egalitarian principles: each of them would be comprised of ‘no less than two repre-
sentatives from each side’, and each side would have its own vehicle and cover its
own expenses.17 The JSETs teams would be responsible for locating unauthorised
water connections, for supervising infrastructure developments, and for monitoring
well extractions, spring discharges and water quality.18
Such management duties aside, one of the major and immediate tasks of the JWC
would be to oversee the development of additional waters for the West Bank’s
Palestinian communities. Oslo II committed Israel and the PA, between them, to
developing during the interim period 23.6 million cubic metres per year (mcmy) of
water from the West Bank’s underground aquifers, ‘in order to meet the immediate
needs of the Palestinians’.19 Oslo II also defined ‘the future needs of the Palestinians’
at an additional 70 to 80 mcmy.20 To put these figures in perspective, it is worth
noting that, as of 1995, total water use amongst West Bank Palestinians stood at a
mere 118 mcmy.21 The clear promise of Oslo II was that the West Bank’s Palestinian
communities would soon be receiving significant new and additional quantities of
water.
Commentators have routinely praised these terms as amongst the most significant
of the Oslo II Agreement. The Israeli press lauded the agreement on water rights as
a ‘breakthrough’.22 Some observers have claimed – with a hyperbole that is unfor-
tunately all too frequent when it comes to discussion of Middle Eastern water issues
– that the Oslo II water accords constitute the most significant result to date of the
entire Oslo process.23 Others, more judiciously, have contended that the ‘water
provisions of the Interim [Oslo II] Agreement represent a major step towards a
permanent Israeli-Palestinian accommodation over water’, a ‘step in the direction of
an equitable water-sharing arrangement’.24 Not all have agreed, of course. From the
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15 Ibid., Article 40 (12); Schedule 8.
16 Ibid., Schedule 9 (1).
17 Ibid., Schedule 9 (2, 3).
18 Ibid., Schedule 9 (4).
19 Ibid., Article 40 (7).
20 Ibid., Article 40 (6).
21 Ibid., Schedule 10.
22 ‘Negotiators Achieve Breakthrough on Water Rights,’ Israel-Line, 25 August 1995.
23 Elaine Fletcher, ‘Israel, PLO Make Deal on West Bank Water’, The San Fransisco Examiner, 21
September 1995; and citing her, Alwyn Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics: The Water Issue in the
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 202.
24 Greg Shapland, Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East (London: Hurst
and Co., 1997), p. 35; Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics, p. 207.
Israeli right, the Oslo II terms have been denounced as ‘a giveaway of our water to
the Arabs’, one that irrevocably effects a ‘loss of control over a major part of the
country’s natural water sources to Arab authorities’; as one critic has put it, ‘for
Israel, the hydro-political future in the wake of the Oslo Accords appears both bleak
and risk-fraught’.25 Yet critical as these right-wing Israeli voices have been, they have
nonetheless depicted the Oslo II terms on water as marking, if not a positive
‘breakthrough’, then at least a sharp discontinuity in the management and control of
the West Bank’s waters. International observers and Israeli critics alike have generally
perceived these water provisions as ‘opening a new era’ in Israeli-Palestinian water
relations.
Most have likewise evinced stark differences between Israel’s various Likud and
Labour administrations in their attitudes towards water cooperation with the
Palestinians. Commentators have suggested that the ‘transition’ promised by Oslo II
thereafter gave way to ‘stalemate’, such that, after 1997, cooperation within the JWC
largely came to a halt.26 PA water officials have argued along similar lines that
Netanyahu’s Likud administration ‘continuously attempted to destroy the agree-
ments and destroy water projects’, and furthermore, that ‘there was nothing wrong
with the agreement’, the problems lying instead in the interpretation and implement-
ation of this agreement by a hostile Israeli government.27 For some, the election of
Ehud Barak in May 1999 and the subsequent agreement of the Sharm-El-Sheikh
Memo raised new ‘hope and optimism’ that outstanding water issues might be
resolved.28 In one way or another, all such commentators have conformed to a
‘breakthrough to breakdown’ narrative of the peace process as a whole, and of
Israeli-Palestinian water cooperation in particular.
There have admittedly been some exceptions to this general rule. Many Palestinian
water experts, for instance, criticised the Oslo II Agreement for its deferral of water
rights questions to final status negotiations, as well as for its tacit legitimation of
Israeli access to ‘Palestinian water resources’ for the duration of the interim
period.29 Implicit in such criticisms is the claim that the Oslo II water provisions do
not constitute a significant breakthrough, and to the extent that Oslo II does not
address water rights issues, and granted Israeli settlers continuing access to West
Bank water supplies, these criticisms are surely valid (under the terms of Oslo II,
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25 Dan Zaslavsky, cited in Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics, p. 206; Martin Sherman, The Politics of
Water in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective on the Hydro-Political Aspects of the Conflict
(London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 108, 112–3.
26 Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics, ch. 7; and Nurit Kliot, ‘A cooperative framework for sharing
scarce water resources: Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority’, in Hussein Amery and Aaron
Wolf (eds.), Water in the Middle East: A Geography of Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2000), p. 204.
27 Fadel Qawash, Deputy Head of the PWA, quoted in Al Quds, 16 April 1998, p. 22; Qawash, PWA
Press Conference, 22 August 1998.
28 Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics, p. 213; Rouyer, ‘Implementation of the Water Accords in the
Oslo II Agreement’, Middle East Policy, 7 (1999), p. 113.
29 Interviews with Abdul Karim Asa’d, General Manager, Jerusalem Water Undertaking, Ramallah
District, 20 July 1998; and Abdul Rahman Tamimi, General Director, Palestinian Hydrology Group,
19 April 1998; Tamimi, ‘A Technical Framework for Final Status Negotiations over Water’,
Palestine–Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, 3 (1996), p. 70–2; see also comments in
Allegra Pacheco, ‘Oslo II and Still No Water’, Middle East International, 3 November 1995, pp.
18–19; and Darci Vetter, The Impact of Article 40 of the Oslo II Agreement on Palestinian Water
Provision (Jerusalem: LAWE, 1995).
Israel would continue to consume 87 per cent of the total water yield of the West
Bank’s two trans-boundary aquifers for the duration of the interim period, with
Palestinians consuming a mere 13 per cent of these waters).30 Nonetheless, such
criticisms do not in my view go quite far enough, since they merely criticise the ‘joint
management’ mechanisms set in place by Oslo II, without questioning whether these
new mechanisms were really as novel as they may at first have seemed. Focusing in
particular on this latter issue, I will attempt to show below that much of what was
agreed in the Oslo II negotiations did little more than to formalise and legitimate
management structures and relations which were already very much in existence.
The repackaging of occupation
Israel’s recognition of Palestinian water rights aside, the Oslo II water accords
achieved three main things: they inaugurated a formal system for the coordinated
management of the West Bank’s water resources, systems and supplies; they estab-
lished a formal system of teams (the JSETs) for supervising and monitoring these
resources, systems and supplies; and they stipulated that additional water would be
made available to the West Bank’s Palestinian communities. But precisely how new –
and how significant a ‘breakthrough’ – were each of these apparent achievements?
Managing resources, systems and supplies
In order to clarify the impact of Oslo II on the management of resources, systems
and supplies, two initial points must be made, first regarding institutional arrange-
ments prior to the onset of the Oslo process, and second regarding the design and
structure of the West Bank’s water supply network.
Even before the end of the 1967 June War, Israel had acted to establish formal rules
governing its control over the West Bank and Gaza. All ‘powers of government,
legislature, appointment and administration in relation to the region or its inhabitants’
were placed in the hands of the Military Governor.31 Under him, a Water Officer
was entrusted with full control over water-related matters within the West Bank.32
This Israeli Water Officer and the Water Department of the Military Government
(later the Civil Administration) became responsible for the allocation of permits and
licences, and effected policy dictated by the Water Commission (which oversees and
coordinates all water policy in Israel) and the Ministry of Defence. Israel’s parastatal
water company, Mekorot, also had significant administrative influence, especially
after 1982 when the then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon oversaw the transfer of
ownership of all water supply systems in the territories to the company – which paid
The case of Israeli–Palestinian water relations 127
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Politics, Law and the Palestinian-Israeli Water Resources (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1997), p. 263.
32 Military Order no. 92 (15 August 1967), as cited ibid., p. 265.
for these assets (estimated at a value of 5 million shekels) a symbolic price of just
one shekel.33 Under occupation, and especially from 1982 onwards, the West Bank’s
water resources and systems were firmly under Israeli control.
Palestinians did nonetheless play a key role in the lower-level management of the
West Bank water sector. Prior to 1967, this sector had been administered by the West
Bank Water Department, answerable to the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority
(NRA).34 In 1967, however, the Water Department was relocated from Jerusalem to
a site adjacent to the Israeli military headquarters at Beit El, where it was placed
under the authority of the Military Government.35 Although some Israelis came
to work there, the Water Department continued to be staffed mainly by those
Palestinians who had previously worked under the NRA. Prior to 1967 the Water
Department had fulfilled a wide range of administrative tasks, having had its own
drilling rigs, for instance; after 1967, these fell into disrepair and the Water Depart-
ment was effectively de-institutionalised.36 Thereafter the Water Department was
only responsible for mundane functional tasks, such as maintaining the West Bank’s
water network, controlling the volume and flow of water supplied to Palestinian
communities (by opening and closing supply valves), and billing (the Water
Department would in turn be billed by Mekorot).37 Thus although after 1982 it was
Mekorot which owned the West Bank’s water supply infrastructure, and controlled
abstraction rates from West Bank wells, it was the Palestinian staff of the Water
Department who were directly responsible for liaising with Palestinians.
The full significance of this arises from the fact that the Water Department’s
relations with Palestinians were quite different from those that it had with Israeli
settlers. The Water Department was not allowed to close supply valves feeding Israeli
settlements, and hence only rationalised supplies to Palestinian communities (this
explains why Israeli settlements received constant water supplies, while Palestinian
communities would be subjected to lengthy cuts).38 Moreover, settlers were billed by
Mekorot rather than by the Water Department, and as in Israel itself, paid for their
water at highly subsidised rates, such that the settlers paid much lower rates than
their Palestinian counterparts (since Mekorot charged the Water Department at non-
subsidised rates). The Water Department hence functioned as a key institutional
interface between the military authorities and the occupied Palestinian population,
ensuring that Israel’s discriminatory water distribution and billing policy could be
effected without any direct contact between Israeli water officials and Palestinian
users. It functioned essentially as a client institution.
Palestinian municipalities and village councils also played a key role in local water
management. Municipalities and village councils were responsible for maintaining
internal networks and for billing individual households within them (forwarding
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33 State Comptroller of Israel, Report on the Management of Water Resources in Israel (Jerusalem:
Government of Israel, 1990). For discussion, see Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics, p. 53; and
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, Water: The Red Line (Jerusalem: JMCC, 1994), p. 46.
34 Elmusa, Water Conflict, p. 270–1.
35 Interview with Taher Nassereddin, Palestinian Head, West Bank Water Department, 12 April 1998.
36 Elmusa, Water Conflict, pp. 271–2; and interview with Taher Nassereddin, 12 April 1998.
37 Interview with Taher Nassereddin, 12 April 1998.
38 Ibid., and interview with Abdul Rahman Tamimi, General Director, Palestinian Hydrology Group, 19
April 1998.
these payments to the Water Authority, which in turn made payments to Mekorot).39
In addition to this, the larger municipalities such as those of Hebron and Bethlehem
operated rotation systems, opening and closing supply valves to ensure that, despite
supply shortfalls, water would be received at sufficiently high pressures within at
least some parts of their internal networks. In each of these various regards, both
the Water Department and the countless municipalities and village councils were abso-
lutely pivotal to the management of the West Bank water sector under occupation.
Prior to 1967, the West Bank’s water supply systems had been essentially local, with
towns and villages supplied by local springs and generally shallow wells. However,
under occupation, and especially after Mekorot was granted control of these systems
in 1982, the structure and design of the West Bank’s water supply infrastructure was
wholly transformed. Deep wells were dug into the West Bank’s aquifers, and new
supply lines were laid from these, supplying both existing Palestinian communities and
the many new and expanding Israeli settlements. Other Israeli settlements and
Palestinian towns and villages, especially those located adjacent to the Green Line,
were connected to and supplied from sources within Israel. Come the onset of the
Oslo process in 1993, therefore, the West Bank’s water supply systems were structured
such that they both conjoined Israeli and Palestinian communities within the West
Bank, and were integrated into Israel’s broader national water supply network.
The effects of these pre-Oslo institutional and infrastructure arrangements were
stark indeed, discriminating sharply between Israelis and Palestinians. As a result of
these arrangements, per capita domestic water supplies to Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza averaged just 38 cubic metres per year (cmy) in 1995, compared to
the 100 cmy supplied to the average Israeli citizen.40 By one (Israeli) estimate, the
average West Bank settler was in receipt of twelve times as much water as the
average West Bank Palestinian.41 If water losses are taken into account, net per
capita municipal supplies in the West Bank averaged only 17 cmy.42 Only half of the
West Bank’s villages had any access to piped water at all.43 And even those
Palestinian communities which did have such access had to endure intermittent
supplies during the summer months. Towns such as Hebron and Bethlehem would
be subject to supply rotations (such that water would be supplied to each area of
town one week in every three, as was the case in Bethlehem), and many peripheral
and high-lying households would go without piped supplies for a period of three or
more months each summer. Isolated villages connected to water supply networks
would in some cases go five or more months without piped supplies.44 Palestinians
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Working Group on Water Resources).
41 Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising – Israel’s Third Front (New York:
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42 CES/GTZ, Middle East Regional Study on Water Supply and Demand Development Concluding Report
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differ from ‘domestic’ in also including water put to industrial and other urban uses.
43 World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace, vol. 5: Infrastructure
(Washington DC: World Bank, 1993), p. 45.
44 Selby, Water, Power and Politics, pp. 108–19.
would also be charged much more for a cubic metre of water than Israelis, and more
still compared to Israeli settlers.45 It was in large part the patron-client structures
created by the Israeli occupation authorities which enabled them to effect such
discrimination.46
As has already been noted, the water accords of the Oslo II Agreement set in
place mechanisms for the coordinated management of the West Bank’s water
resources, systems and supplies. A Joint Water Committee (JWC) would be estab-
lished to oversee this coordinated management system. Supply infrastructures, how-
ever, would not be managed directly by the JWC, but by one or other of the parties;
systems ‘related solely to Palestinians’ would be ‘operated and maintained by the
Palestinian side solely’, while all other systems would remain under Israeli control.47
The implications of this should by now be readily apparent. The Palestinians would
henceforth be responsible for maintaining and operating internal systems within
Palestinian towns and villages, as well as those connections to such internal systems
which did not feed Israeli settlements. Yet given that by 1995 Israeli and Palestinian
water supply networks were thoroughly integrated, this did not promise the
Palestinians a great deal: Israel would continue to control the vast majority of
supply lines, and would also continue to control the numerous deep wells which had
been drilled since 1982, since these all supplied at least some Israeli settlements.
Moreover, given that most local water supply and infrastructure management within
the West Bank was already being undertaken by Palestinians – both by the West
Bank Water Department, and by municipalities and village councils – the seeming
novelty of Oslo II’s coordinated management system was largely illusory. The water
accords of the Oslo II Agreement merely formalised a supply management system
which had been in operation for years, presenting it, misleadingly, as part of an
egalitarian-sounding ‘joint’ and ‘coordinated’ management system.
Very much the same can be said regarding water prices. Oslo II stipulated that ‘in
the case of purchase of water by one side from the other, the purchaser shall pay the
full real cost incurred by the supplier, including the cost of production at the source
and the conveyance all the way to the point of delivery’.48 At first glance this would
appear fair and reasonable. As noted above, however, the Israeli authorities would
continue to exercise control over the West Bank’s water resources, and over all
‘upstream’ facilities, such that the Israeli authorities would always be the ‘suppliers’,
Palestinian authorities and communities the ‘purchasers’. Moreover, the terms of
this article apply only to transactions between Israelis and Palestinians, placing no
constraints on purchases by Israeli settlers. Yet as we have already seen, the latter
pay for their water at highly subsidised rates. Thus under the reasonable-sounding
terms of Oslo II, Palestinians would have no option but to pay the ‘full real cost’ of
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47 Israel and the PLO, Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix 1, Article 40 (4); Schedule 8 (2.b).
48 Ibid., Article 40 (18).
production and supply to the Israeli authorities, while these same authorities would
be free to continue supplying settlers at rates well below the real cost of production
and supply. As with the management of systems and supplies, Oslo II simply
legitimised a discriminatory pricing mechanism which had existed since well before
1995.
Beyond this, the Oslo II arrangements had one extra benefit for Israel. Since the
onset of the intifada in 1987, the West Bank Water Department had been facing
increasing levels of non-payment by Palestinian municipalities and individuals, such
that by 1995 it had debts of around US$4.5 m. With the inauguration of a formal
‘joint management’ system, these debts suddenly became taken on by the Palestinian
side, being covered by the Palestinian Ministry of Finance.49 The formalisation of
Israeli-Palestinian cooperation had enabled Israel to divest itself of some of the most
onerous burdens of occupation, without losing control of either water resources or
supplies to Israeli settlements, and without having to forego its discriminatory pricing
policy.
Monitoring resources
If we turn now to consider the Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETs),
we find something conspicuously similar. Besides maintaining the West Bank’s water
networks, one of the Water Department’s main tasks under occupation involved
monitoring the West Bank’s springs and wells. In this, Palestinian technicians within
the Water Department followed a system developed during the late 1960s and early
70s under the direction of the Israeli Hydrological Service (IHS).50 As early as
September 1967, the IHS and Water Department had begun developing procedures
for the monitoring of the territory’s water resources. By the early 1970s, a hydro-
logical monitoring system was in full operation. Monitoring was for a time
conducted jointly by Israeli and Palestinian technicians, but thereafter only by the
latter.51
Oslo II stipulated that ‘no less than five’ JSETs would be established under the
direction of the JWC to monitor and police the West Bank’s water resources,
systems and supplies.52 Three such teams were immediately established, each of
them responsible for hydrological monitoring.53 The twist here lies, however, in the
fact that these three JSETs followed precisely the same monitoring system as had
been followed since the early 1970s by the West Bank Water Department. Monitor-
ing was conducted by the same Palestinian technicians, and in line with the very
same procedures and schedule; and data was recorded on forms which barely
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27 June 1998; also Water Resources Action Programme, Hydrological Monitoring in Palestine: Status
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51 Interview with Mustapha Nuseibi, 27 June 1998.
52 Israel and the PLO, Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix 1, Schedule 9 (1).
53 Interviews with Mustapha Nuseibi, 27 June 1998; and Taher Nassereddin, 15 August 1998.
differed from those which had been used prior to the Oslo II Agreement.54 Formally
speaking, a state of ‘joint supervision’ and cooperation had replaced one of occupa-
tion and domination, but in terms of the monitoring work which was actually
undertaken, changes were only minimal and by no means altogether positive for the
Palestinians.
The new JSETs regime brought about three main changes, none of which are as
significant or as beneficial as they may initially appear. First and most obviously, the
Water Department’s workers were now accompanied on site visits by Israelis.
Nonetheless, the Palestinians remained the ones conducting hydrological readings,
with the Israeli teams ‘just writing down the numbers’.55 Hence in this regard, the
new JSETs system did little more than to return monitoring procedures to those of
the early 1970s, when Israeli technicians accompanied their Palestinian counterparts
around the West Bank’s water sources. Second, whereas under occupation Palestinian
technicians would carry out their work without any escort, JSETs teams are always
accompanied by Israeli soldiers, and sometimes also by Palestinian police. Yet here
too an important rider must be offered: given that the West Bank is so fragmented
between these zones, and given also that adjacent districts are under the control of
different military and police officers, the task of organising security convoys unsur-
prisingly causes immense logistical difficulties, and consumes a large amount of
time.56 Indeed, according to the JSETs’ Palestinian coordinator, monitoring now
takes ‘double the time’ that it did under occupation.57 In each of these regards, the
main achievement of the JSETs regime was simply to create an extra layer of
bureaucracy and a great deal of additional labour for Israeli and Palestinian water
managers.
Thirdly, following the agreement the Palestinians became entitled to make use of
JSETs data. Under occupation, the Water Department had no means of aggregating
and abstracting data, and hence record sheets were simply stored in the office by Beit
El, copies being collected once a month by someone from the IHS.58 By contrast, the
Water Department now forwards copies of its records to the Palestinian Water
Authority (PWA) which, with the support of various international donors, has since
1996 been developing its own water resource databases.59 Both Israeli and
Palestinian water authorities now have access to JSETs data. This is evidently
significant, and might well be taken as grounds for characterising the new JSETs
system as a prime example of truly ‘joint management’. Nonetheless, the PWA has
been utterly dependent on international donors in developing its water databases –
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58 Ibid.
59 Interview with Basema Bashir, Manager, Hydrological Information System, PWA, 4 April 1998.
and donors have shown little interest in funding such low profile work, being much
keener to ‘fly the flag’ over highly visible and prestige projects.60 The PWA, in
addition, has had little access to past hydrological data, and neither does it have
access to some of the most important current data, since the Israeli authorities have
refused to transfer key information on extraction levels from wells located within
Israeli settlements.61 Given this, the PWA’s water databases are heavily incomplete
and of little practical utility, such that Palestinian water planners and negotiators
and international donors alike have remained wholly reliant on Israeli databases,
plans and models.62 Israel has traditionally kept tight and secretive reins over its
most important water-related information, and has arguably used this info-control
to its advantage in negotiations with the Palestinians.63 While under Oslo II the PA
has been granted the opportunity to use Palestinian-collected data – no longer do the
Palestinians simply transfer record sheets to the Israeli authorities – the PA is
nonetheless denied the opportunity of making meaningful use of this information.
There may well now exist a formal mechanism for the ‘joint supervision’ of the West
Bank’s water resources, but it is one which continues to enshrine overall Israeli
control over water-related information.
Developing new supplies
So much one might be willing to concede; but didn’t the Oslo II Agreement also
hold out the promise of additional water supplies for the West Bank’s Palestinian
communities? Indeed it did: 23.6 mcmy would be made available within the West
Bank in order to meet the ‘immediate needs of the Palestinians . . . during the
interim period’, while a further 41.4–51.4 mcmy would be developed to meet the
‘future needs’ of West Bank Palestinian communities.64 Yet significant as these
provisions undoubtedly are, their overall import is qualified in a number of regards.
In the first place, these provisions placed only a minimal burden on Israel. Of the
total promised new and additional supply to the West Bank of 65–75 mcmy, Israel
would be financially responsible only for the development of 4.5 mcmy, with the
Palestinians bearing the capital costs of developing the remaining 61.5–71.5 mcmy.
Moreover, Israel would have to sacrifice only a minimal loss of water, since of the
planned additional West Bank supply of 65–75 mcmy, Israel would only have to
supply 3.1 mcmy from its national water system.65 In these respects, the Oslo II
Agreement simply enabled Israel to divest itself of the burden of developing much-
needed additional waters for the Palestinians, transferring the financial burden for
improving Palestinian water supplies from Mekorot to the international donor
community and in turn the PA (which will at some point have to start repaying its
soft loans to international donors).
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64 Israel and the PLO, Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix 1, Article 40 (7), (7.b.vi).
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All of the water not made available by Israel from its national water network
would be developed ‘from the Eastern Aquifer and other agreed sources in the West
Bank’.66 The Eastern Aquifer was named here in particular because, according to
Israeli-derived hydrological data included alongside the Oslo II water accords, this
was the only one of the West Bank’s three underground bodies of water which was
not yet being exploited to its fullest. By happy coincidence, its additional potential
yield – estimated in Oslo II as 78 mcmy – would be just sufficient to meet all of the
Palestinians’ immediate and future water needs.67 However, there is compelling
evidence that it vastly overstates the remaining potential of the Eastern Aquifer.
Water table levels are already rapidly declining in parts of the aquifer; much of its
waters are highly saline, and would possibly need to be desalinated at great expense
if they were to be used for domestic or agricultural purposes; most startlingly of all,
one of the Israeli hydrologists who produced the figure of 78 mcmy discounts the
possibility that its entirety could be exploited on a sustainable basis.68 The PWA and
international donors have started developing new supplies from the Eastern Aquifer,
its first new waters having come on tap in late 1999.69 Nonetheless, the remaining
potential of the aquifer is far below that officially given in the Oslo II Agreement.
Thus by way of a second qualification, it can be said that the newly-granted
Palestinian right to further develop the Eastern Aquifer – seemingly an act of great
Israeli generosity – is unlikely to yield its expected and hoped-for benefits.
As a third qualification, the structure of the JWC also serves to set constraints on
Palestinian development of the West Bank’s water resources. We have already seen
that decisions within the JWC operate by consensus. Yet given that all infrastructure
development works ‘require the prior approval of the JWC’, it follows that each of
the parties has an effective veto over the other’s proposals.70 And while in principle
this applies equally to both sides, in practice it places by far the biggest constraints
on the Palestinians, simply because they are so much more needful of new and
additional supplies. As it has turned out, Israel has only been willing to assent to
well developments into the Eastern Aquifer, and has vetoed the Palestinian develop-
ment of ‘other agreed sources in the West Bank’.71 Moreover, the PA has only
succeeded in avoiding the Israeli veto on its other infrastructure development
proposals by entering into a tacit modus vivendi with the Israeli authorities, one in
which Israel has been willing to grant licenses for Palestinian development of the
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area between Bethlehem and Hebron is dropping at an alarming rate; for example, at one well site the
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discussion, see Selby, Water, Power and Politics, pp. 135–51.
69 USAID West Bank and Gaza Mission, ‘USAID-funded expansion of the Bethlehem-Hebron water
supply system complete’, Press Release, 5 December 1999.
70 Israel and the PLO, Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix 1, Schedule 8 (1.b). The same point is
made by Elmusa, Water Conflict, p. 131; and Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics, p. 223.
71 Interview with Taher Nassereddin, 15 August 1998; Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics, pp. 225, 228.
Eastern Aquifer, but only in return for permission to construct new and enlarged
water supply systems from within the Green Line to Israeli settlements in the West
Bank.72 While the PA has assented to this new construction work only on condition
that it is not taken as implying recognition or acceptance of Israeli settlements, the
fact remains that the PA has in practice had little option, under the seemingly
egalitarian terms of Oslo II, but to assent to the extension and entrenchment of
Israeli ‘facts on the ground’ throughout the West Bank.73
As if this were not bad enough, the PA is not entitled to unilaterally amend or
abrogate any of the laws or military orders which were in place on the eve of the
Oslo II Agreement, the consequence of this being that all those water-related
military orders which were put in place by the Israeli authorities in the wake of the
1967 war remain in force.74 Thus ultimate decision-making authority over water
resources and systems continues to lie with the Water Officer of the Civil Adminis-
tration, who can in theory veto any Palestinian infrastructure development proposal,
even after it has received the consent of the JWC. Such has in fact occurred on
numerous occasions, especially when proposed well locations and supply lines have
clashed with Israeli plans for new settlements and bypass roads.75
In each of these four regards – the facts that Palestinians and international donors
carry almost all the responsibility for developing new supplies; that the Eastern
Aquifer has a much smaller remaining potential than is officially recognised; that the
structure of the JWC places greater constraints on the Palestinians than on Israel;
and that the Civil Administration still retains an ultimate veto over Palestinian water
developments – in each of these regards, the promises of new and additional
supplies contained in the Oslo II Agreement are of much less significance than at
first appears. Each of these four qualifications, it should be emphasised, follow
directly from the terms of the Oslo II Agreement, not from their post-hoc
interpretation and implementation (and moreover, the modus vivendi which has
emerged over infrastructure developments did so during 1998, whilst Israel was
being headed by the Likud government of Bibi Netanyahu). This is not to say, of
course, that all Israeli and Palestinian actions in the water sphere have operated
within the terms of Oslo II. On the Israeli side, pipelines have on several occasions
been laid to West Bank settlements without receipt of JWC permission (and in some
cases where Israeli proposals have been rejected by Palestinian JWC officials).76 In
cases where the Israeli authorities cannot achieve their projects through the legal-
institutional mechanisms of the JWC, they can always resort to their far superior
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coercive capabilities to ensure that their pipelines get constructed as and when they
require.77 This hardly represents a model of ‘joint’ and ‘coordinated’ management.
Conclusion
The Oslo II Agreement has undoubtedly engendered some important institutional
and material changes in the management and development of the West Bank’s water
resources, systems and supplies. Two such changes stand out above all. The
agreement has inspired, most importantly, a massive influx of development aid, with
money being channelled into the rehabilitation and construction of supply systems,
as well as into the creation of the PA’s water institutions. Problem-ridden though it
has often been, this development aid has nonetheless led to marked improvements in
the regularity and quantity of water supplies to many of the West Bank’s towns and
villages (especially to the towns of Hebron, Bethlehem and Jenin, courtesy of a large
USAID-funded project), and scattered improvements in the collection and treatment
of wastewater and sewerage.78
Beyond this, the Oslo II Agreement also resulted in the creation of new institu-
tional arrangements, and a new distribution of decision-making powers, on the
Palestinian side. Prior to Oslo II, the West Bank Water Department was the key
Palestinian water institution, acting as an interface between the Israeli military and
water authorities on the one hand, and Palestinian municipalities, village councils
and individuals on the other. After Oslo II, institutional arrangements became a
great deal more complex (as well as bureaucratised). The Palestinian water sector is
now formally under the authority and purview of the PWA.79 In many respects,
however, the PWA is little more than a donor construct, its main responsibility being
to coordinate donor projects, and the vast majority of its personnel being employed
on a project basis.80 Moreover, as during the occupation, the West Bank Water
Department is in many respects the most important Palestinian water institution
within the West Bank, it being the Water Department, and not the PWA, which
undertakes everyday water management. Simply put, the PWA oversees projects,
while the Water Department undertakes mundane water management, very much as
it did under occupation. Thus the main institutional change within the Palestinian
water sector has been the creation of a new and financially well-endowed top tier of
administration, one that is defined and exists through its relations with the inter-
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national donor community, and is headed by ‘outsider’ political appointees closely
associated with Yasser Arafat.81
In other respects, the changes effected by the Oslo II Agreement have been
predominantly discursive rather than material or institutional. We have seen above
that many of the Water Department’s patron-client responsibilities under occupation
were simply repackaged and recodified by the Oslo II Agreement as elements of a
‘coordinated’ management system. Israeli and Palestinian water managers have
evidently been keen to obscure this fact, partly because this would raise difficult
questions about the significance of the peace process, and partly, in the Palestinian
case, out of an understandable desire not to say too much about the key roles that
fellow Palestinians played in administering water under the occupation, and in a
sense facilitating it. Yet allusions to the less-than-substantive changes wrought by
the Oslo process do occasionally seep out. Discussing the Oslo II negotiations and
agreements – or what he woefully misrepresents as the ‘dismantling of occupation’ –
Israeli negotiator Uri Savir observes with surprising candour that ‘I feared that what
would emerge from this makeover was more of the same on different stationery’.82
This admission strikes me as providing a curiously apt diagnosis of many of the
consequences, often more discursive than substantial, of the water articles of the
Oslo II Agreement. Israeli-Palestinian hydro-political relations within the West Bank
were suddenly presented as ‘cooperative’ – rather than, say, ‘oppressive’, which is
how we would surely characterise these relations as they existed during the occupation
– not because such and such management or monitoring procedures had changed,
but because the signing of the Oslo II Agreement bestowed on these procedures a
new-found legitimacy. ‘Cooperation’, within this agreement, denotes not a practical
and material set of relations which are the antithesis of ‘domination’, but a dis-
cursive condition which arises and exists on the strength of a single tacit rule, one
that stipulates that ‘cooperation’ only occurs between free and equal consenting
parties. Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo II Agreement as juridically free and
equal parties – this, of course, being irrespective of the fact that one of the parties
was vastly less free than the other, and that the parties were far from equal in their
actual (military, political, institutional and economic) capabilities – and it was
through this legal act that Israeli-Palestinian water relations within the West Bank
became represented as ‘cooperative’.
One might perhaps counter-argue that the above ignores the fact that Oslo II was
intended as a transitional arrangement, one that was not necessarily absolutely just,
but which nonetheless represented ‘a step in the direction of an equitable water-
sharing arrangement’.83 I would disagree. It would be a mistake to evaluate the
merits or otherwise of the Oslo II agreement on the grounds of the avowed intention
of exchanging occupation for cooperation. The Israeli-PLO accords must be judged,
rather, with an eye to the substantive material changes wrought by them. Evaluated
thus, the evidence suggests that the Oslo II water accords did not really ‘step’
anywhere; this ‘transitional arrangement’ was a transition in little more than name.
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Given all this, it should come as no surprise that Israeli–Palestinian ‘cooperation’
over water issues has continued since the breakdown of the peace process. During
the first few months of the intifada there were no meetings of the JWC.84 In January
2001, however, the JWC made a joint declaration urging people to keep water
infrastructures ‘out of the cycle of violence’.85 Since then the JWC has met, albeit
irregularly, and has been discussing and approving new projects. Moreover, the PWA
is still approving new supply lines to Israeli settlements: during early 2002, for
instance, approval was granted for an 11 km and 32 inch pipeline from the Green
Line to Gush Etzion.86 For practical reasons, the JSETs system has not been
functioning at all.87 However, for the most part the conventional breakthrough to
breakdown narrative simply does not apply to Israeli–Palestinian water relations.
It should not be thought, however, that discursive changes simply sit atop material
realities without impacting on them, or that the dressing up of Israel’s domination
of the West Bank’s water resources, systems and supplies in liberal and legalistic
terms has had no significant material or institutional effects. On the contrary, the
recent material improvements in water supplies to many of the West Bank’s
Palestinian communities have been largely attendant upon the discursive dressing up
of occupation as ‘cooperation’. The Oslo agreements and process as a whole
bestowed a new-found legitimacy on Israeli-Palestinian relations (or at least
signalled a gradual move towards legitimation of these relations, the ‘peace process’).
Persuaded of the existence of the ‘peace process’ as a whole, and in 1995 of a ‘break-
through’ in Israeli-Palestinian water relations, international donors were suddenly
willing to take over from Israel the burden of ameliorating the critical water situa-
tion in the Palestinian territories. International donor monies, in turn, have directly
resulted in improved water supplies to many West Bank Palestinian communities.
These improvements have arguably followed less from the precise terms of the
agreement – many of which are of illusory significance, and others of which are
subject to an Israeli veto and to Israel’s military power – than indirectly from the
agreement’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.
Much of what the Oslo II water accords directly achieved was discursive, insub-
stantial and altogether illusory. To speak of Israeli-Palestinian ‘cooperation’ in the
water sector is to use no less than a misnomer. This is not, however, simply because
‘the outcome of cooperation between an elephant and a fly is not hard to predict’, as
Chomsky so pithily writes (since this is to assume that ‘co-operation’ represents a
valid descriptor for Israeli-Palestinian relations), but because in the context of the
Oslo peace process, ‘cooperation’ is often only minimally different from the
occupation and domination that went before it.88 ‘Cooperation’, in this context, is
above all an internationally pleasing and acceptable signifier which obscures rather
than elucidates the nature of Israeli-Palestinian relations. Or as Meron Benvenisti so
succinctly puts it, ‘“cooperation” based on the current power relationship is little
more than permanent Israeli domination in disguise’.89
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